Blocking critical operations of Stalin and Hitler








The Soviet-propagated myth of a Finnish aggression and defeat in the 1941-1944 Finnish-Soviet Continuation War has died hard.

This is largely due to the deep-embedded Cold War period false history writing of the Soviet Union, which in many ways was carried on to the "official" post- Soviet-period Russian interpretation of the war.

Whereas the 1939-1940 Soviet Winter War aggression against Finland, launched by the Soviet attack on November 30, 1939, was left out from the history writing of the Soviet Union, the massive Soviet war-initiating offensive against Finland on June 25, 1941, still today often continues to be over-looked in Russia, while Finland erroneously gets blamed for having been the aggressor in the Continuation War.

An additional cause for confusion are the concessions and the ceding of land which the Finns agreed to in the 1947 Paris Peace Agreement, despite of their defensive victory in the Continuation War which had ended in 1944.

However, an increasing number of Russians previously in doubt have recently become aware and fully convinced that until the start of the Continuation War the Finns had decided to remain neutral and not to attack the Soviets, unless they were to attack Finland first.

Only recently has the Russian general public gradually began to accept as the factual cause for the war the continued Soviet intent to invade Finland and the consequential Soviet attack against Finland over air, land and sea in June, 1941.

Accordingly, the Finnish offensive campaign to follow is now becoming correctly realized as a mere necessary counter-offensive, in which the Finns succeeded in pushing back the attacking enemy and then in keeping the enemy behind the Finnish-Soviet border until the end of the war.

By 1944, through the course of the two consecutive wars launched by the Soviets, the Finns had managed to block the take-over attempts of the Soviet Union and in saving Finland as an independent and sovereign nation.

Among all nations warring in Europe during WW2 west from the Soviet Union and in addition to England, Helsinki was the only capital never to become occupied by enemy.

Whereas all other European nations bordering the Soviet Union ended up either becoming a part of it or were forced to become its satellite following WW2 - the aim of Josif Stalin -, Finland, despite of its longest border with the Soviet Union, was able to continue its democratic parlamentarianism uninterrupted throughout WW2 and beyond.

The Soviet Union fell far from its objective, conquering Finland, a goal set forth in Moscow on August 23, 1939, by the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. Two days before, Stalin had spelled out to the Soviet State Duma his master plan - now kept secret - to attack westward.

Continuing the following year after the ending of the Winter War, the repeated Soviet take-over attempt of Finland lasting from 1941 to 1944 - named the Continuation War - was a part of that Soviet master plan, a Soviet intent to conquer the entire Europe and more.

What became the major interference for Stalin's intent to forcefully spread the Soviet totalitarian realm westward, which included the conquest of Finland, was the unexpected German attack eastward, launched on June 22, 1941, a.k.a. Operation Barbarossa.





Separate war from the Allied-Axis conflict



Despite of the Continuation War taking place during WW2 and the Finns and the Nazis sharing a common enemy, the Soviet Union, the Continuation War was not a part of the war fought between the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers.

The Finnish-Soviet conflict was a separate conflict from the Allied-Axis conflict, and its aftermath was dealt under a separate, conditional peace treaty - not unconditional like the one forced to the Axis Powers, which lose their war.

Differing from the German WW2 war efforts, the war time struggles of the Finns between 1939 and 1944 were defensive by nature and - accordingly - based on entirely different objectives from those of the Germans.

In the spring of 2005, the President of Finland Tarja Halonen stated in a speech in Paris:

"For us World War II meant a separate war against the Soviet Union."

In the Presidential Forum VIII held in Helsinki on November 19, 2008, Halonen commented on that statement by saying:

I still believe that the speech described - and still does - the Finns’ feelings about the matter." (Helsingin Sanomat, 20.11.2008)

"Professor Ohto Manninen continued to regard the ”separate war” as a perfectly good term." "Finland’s relationship with other countries was crucial - not the relations between Finland and Germany, Manninen explained." (Helsingin Sanomat, 20.11.2008)

"He also pointed out that the Soviet Union tried to conclude peace separately with Finland already in the winter of early 1944. Furthermore, even the United States regarded the war between Finland and the Soviet Union as a separate conflict." (Helsingin Sanomat, 20.11.2008)

Notably, unconditional surrender was not required from Finland, when the Soviets sought to make a separate peace with the Finns during the winter of 1943-1944. Unconditional surrender was required from the Nazis and all their allies, however.

The Soviets did not try to deny having been the aggressor in and having started the Continuation War against the Finns. Had the Finns been the aggressor, only unconditional surrender would have been considered for them as the end result.

"A separate peace with Finland was discussed at the summit meeting of the three major powers in Teheran on December 1, 1943. Roosevelt spoke in favor of Finland, and so did Churchill, even though Britain had declared war on Finland in December 1941. Stalin admitted that “a people that had fought so valiantly for its independence deserves consideration”." (News, 9/23/2004, Embassy of Finland, Washington)

On November 30, 2008, the Editor in Chief Janne Virkkunen of the Helsingin Sanomat - Finland's largest daily newspaper - stated in the paper's editorial section the following:

"Finland's official policy remains that Continuation War was a separate war."

Soviets had decided to draw Finland to a war



The Soviet attempt to occupy Finland in the Winter War, starting in 1939, had been pre-approved by Adolf Hitler in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939. On November 12-13, 1940, in Berlin the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sought for a renewed Hitler's approval for the Soviet take-over campaign on Finland. However, Hitler no longer approved.

Nevertheless, that did not stop the continued Soviet determination and intent to over-take Finland. The previously secret Soviet archives opened for researchers during the post-Soviet period prior to Vladimir Putin's presidency reveal how thoroughly pre-planned the Soviet intent to invade Finland was.

To save themselves from the destiny of their Baltic neighbors, the Finns had been left with no other choice following the Winter War, but to begin preparing themselves for a renewed Soviet attack.

During the Interim Peace period - the 15 months' truce following the Winter War -, Finland made no plans to attack the Soviet Union. Instead, subject to an escalating Soviet aggression Finland began preparing itself for a defensive warfare (Mannerheim, 1952) against anticipated renewed Soviet attack.

It quickly dawned on the Finns that - unless a miracle were to happen - a rapidly approaching renewed Soviet invasion was inevitable and unavoidable, as the Soviets persisted in presenting more radical demands to the Finns, surrendering to which would have meant a disaster for Finland.

Following the Winter War, the Soviets launched a campaign to manipulate the Finnish political decision making processes, including the naming of the highest ranking Finnish government officials. What the Soviets had not been able to gain in the battles of the Winter War, they now tried to achieve during the truce, without firing a bullet.

The Red Army continued building up forces and constructing numerous air fields by Finland's border, same time committing countless border violations against Finland.

Additionally, the Soviets began demanding control of some strategically vital parts of the Southern Finnish railroads and pressuring Finland to rapidly complete the Salla railroad in Lapland, which led from the Soviet Union through Finland to Sweden. According to recently published (Manninen, 2008) WW2-period Soviet documents, the Salla railway played an essential part in the Soviet plan to attack westward in the summer of 1941.

"The railroad construction that had started by the Soviets on the fall of 1939 proceeded rapidly. The most important stretches of the railroad, Petroskoi-Suojärvi, Louhi-Kiestinki ja Rutši-Salla were completed in a few months' time. To the last-mentioned stretch alone, over 100'000 forced labor workers were stationed. These railroad stretches were supported by 15 strategic roads for motor vehicles.

On approximately 200 kilometers wide boundary behind the border airports were being built, the number of which was later concluded to be as many as 90." ('Memoirs' - Mannerheim)

At this point, all the Baltic countries as well as Norway and Denmark had become occupied by either the Nazis or the Soviets. Finland's supply routes were now sealed from all sides. Even theoretically, Germany was now the only possible source of arms for the Finnish defense.

Thus, the Finns were forced to agree to a limited level of cooperation with the Nazis. Yet, no military alliance pact was ever signed, and all the Nazis' key proposals for military cooperation were turned down.

In his book, 'Jatkosodan synty' ("The Launching of the Continuation War"), p. 606-607, Professor Mauno Jokipii explains how the Soviet Union officially emphasized that it had launched the Continuation War. The first attack to Finnish territory took place on June 22, 1941, starting 06:05, after which two Finnish submarines landed mines on the Estonian coast:

"The Soviet Union does not even try to deny its own initiative in the launching of the massive offensive. In contrary, it is being emphasized. The question who started has been solved: The Soviet Union admits in an official publication to have started the air raid in Finland and the Nordic."

Finns refuse to form alliance with the Nazis

"Around June 10, 1941, Colonel Buschenhagen arrived in Helsinki again. It became evident from his statements at the General Staff, that his mission this time was on the one hand to discuss practical details of possible cooperation, in case the Soviet Union would attack Finland, and on the other hand to seek guarantees that Finland would join the war as a German ally.

After I presented the matter to the president of the Republic and he had assured me that he would stick to his old stance, I had it be announced to Colonel Buschenhagen that no guarantees could be given of Finland joining the war. Finland had decided to stay neutral unless it was attacked." ('Memoirs' - Mannerheim)

As in Sweden, the Germans were granted a passage right through Northern Finland to the North Atlantic coast of Norway. No direct German attacks against the Soviets were permitted from Finnish soil, however.

Accordingly, on June 23, 1941 - two days before the Soviet launching of the Continuation War -, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov made no mentioning of Germans being in Finland or of any Finnish-German deal made, the 'Memoirs' of Mannerheim points out.

This was in line with the fact, that they were the Soviets themselves that had forced Finland to take the first step aside from its neutrality, when the Soviets had demanded passage rights to Hanko (dangerous for Finland, as Helsinki was on the route, allowing the Soviets a chance for a surprise attack).

"Instead, he (Molotov) focused again in accusing Finland of an attack, which had not happened. The Soviet leadership had decided to draw Finland to a war." ('Memoirs' - Mannerheim)

Following the Soviet war-opening attack against Finland on June 25, 1941, the Nazis were permitted to operate through Northern Finland, but the Finns kept the Nazis away from the critical Southern Finnish battle fronts, where the Finns froze their counter offensive - saving Leningrad in the process - and permitted the Allied supply lines to operate uninterrupted.

Many scholars believe that Mannerheim's refusal to attack Leningrad ultimately saved the city, because a coordinated German-Finnish attack launched in September, 1941, would have overwhelmed the Soviet defenses (Robert Jackson, Battle of the Baltic, The wars 1918–1945, 2007)

By its strategy, the Finnish Defense Forces did not only deny a huge victory from the Nazis in Leningrad, but also allowed the Red Army to release its forces to further south where they were desperately needed. In a critical way, what the Finns did - and what they didn't do - effected the course of WW2 and quite possibly even the final outcome of it as well.

In multiple ways, the Finns - de facto - greatly contributed to the Allied war efforts against the Axis. The Finns refused to cooperate with the Nazis in a wide range of essential areas. They kept distance from them for instance by:

• not signing the Tripartite Pact, also called the Axis Pact, which established the Axis Powers of World War II;

• not allowing direct German attacks from the Finnish soil against the Soviet Union during the Interim Peace period;

• not accepting the 80 000 elite German soldiers offered to be placed under command of Marshal Mannerheim;

• not agreeing to attack the Soviet Union, unless/until the Soviet Union would attack Finland first;

• not cooperating in the siege of Leningrad;

• not cutting the Allied "lifeline", which was operated over Lake Ladoga to bring desperately needed supplies to the defenders of Leningrad;

• not cutting down the Murmansk railroad, used for delivering massive amounts of Allied weapons and other supplies to the Soviets;

• not attacking any same major targets as the Germans (during the 1944 Soviet summer offensive, German air support was given to the Finns in the south, however);

• not handing Finnish Jews to the Nazis. The Finnish Jews participated in the Finnish war efforts just like all other Finnish citizens;

• not denying the right of asylum from over 500 Jewish refugees (eight were denied however).

• not declaring war against any other Allied countries except Soviet Union, which attacked Finland;

• not ending secret high level talks between the US Embassy in Helsinki and the Finns - etc.

Finns freeze counter offensive - save Leningrad



On June 25, 1941, the Soviets attacked Finland, launching the Continuation War. During the following weeks and months the Red Army was gradually pushed back east by a Finnish counter offensive.

The Soviet military infrastructure, air fields and support systems near the Finnish border were destroyed or captured, to block their usage for further attacks against Finland and to prevent a Soviet take-over of Finland.

The Finns brought their counter offensive to a halt on lines which they saw best fitting for the defending of Finland against further Soviet aggressions, until the final terms for peace could agreed upon. For Finland's protection, these defensive lines during the war had to be on the Soviet side of the border, on the most critical areas.

Yet - importantly -, not to interfere the Allied war against the Nazis, on some areas the Finns did not cross the border to the Soviet side.

On September 11, 1941, the US ambassador Arthur Schoenfeld was informed that the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was halted at the pre- Winter War border (with a few "straightened curves" at the municipalities of Valkeasaari and Kirjasalo) and that under no conditions would Finland participate in an offensive against Leningrad, but would instead maintain a static defense and wait for a political resolution. The Foreign Minister of Finland Rolf Witting stressed to Schoenfeld that Germany, however, should not hear of this.

During the following trench war period, lasting approximately two and a half years, the Finns stayed still on these defensive lines and held back from interrupting the major Allied supply lines - the Murmansk railroad in particular. It was used to bring in supplies to the Soviets, meant to support their war against the Nazis. However, in the Soviet hands the imported Allied weapons ended up being used against the Finns too. Nevertheless, the Finns stood steady in their decision not to interfere with the conflict between the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers.

On the northeast side of the huge Lake Ladoga, the Finns halted their counter-offensive on the level of the Svir River - Syväri in Finnish -, a tributary to Lake Ladoga, thus not assisting the Nazis in their attempted to achieve a full encirclement around the city of Leningrad. Importantly too, this also enabled the Allied supply line - a.k.a. "life line" - to continue operating uninterrupted over Lake Ladoga, delivering critically needed supplies to the Soviets in Leningrad during the 900 days' Nazi siege of the city.





Conquest of Europe was to begin from Finland



The Soviet Union had prepared to attack westward in July, 1941, with the largest offensive forces in history. The plan was called Groza. The intent of the Red Army was to invade Finland, Sweden and Norway to be used as a bridgehead for a follow-up attack into Central Europe.

The massive June 25, 1941, Soviet attack against Finland was to be the first stage of the much larger offensive westward to follow (Ohto Manninen, 2008). Finland was intended to be over-taken even faster now that had been planned for the Winter War.

Stalin was certain that the Nazis would not attack inside the Soviet Union. However, the Nazis did attack first. This prevented the Soviet intension from ever fully materializing.

Nevertheless, the end result was a rather good one for the Soviets. Although many countries intended to be invaded were saved from a Soviet occupation - much thanks to the brilliant maneuvering of the Finns -, a big part of Europe did end up under the Soviet control for decades.

An average Soviet soldier had never been aware of the true plans of their leaders. All Soviet wartime maneuvers had been explained to the Sovies citizens as a part of a Soviet defensive struggle, an illusion carried on up to date in Russia. In the West, the true Soviet intentions were not realized either at the time of WW2.

Now, seven decades later, a large majority of the archives relating to the status of the Soviet Union on June 21, 1941, is closed to researchers. What is there to hide - a plan for after the conquest of Europe ?

A rapidly increasing number of historians worldwide have become convinced that the above-introduced Soviet offensive plan would have materialized if the Nazis would not have taken the initiative. In a speech now kept secret, Josif Stalin had introduced yhe plan to the Soviet State Duma already on August 21, 1939, two days before the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany.

Known historians specializing in the WW2 period Soviet affairs who have shown in writing that in their view the Soviet intention to attack westward was real include - but are not limited to - the following:

• Sampo Ahto, colonel • Fritz Becker, historian • Lev Bezymenskin, professor • Tatjana S. Bushujeva, historian • V. Danilov, historian • Juri L. Djakov, historian • Juri Gorkov, historian • Tapani Havia, professor • Joachim Hoffman, historian • Daniel C. Holtrop, historian • Heinz Magenheimer, historian • Ohto Manninen, professor • Mihail Meltjuhov, historian • V. A. Nevezhinin, historian • Erkki Nordberg, colonel • I. V. Pavlova, historian • Edvard Radzinski, historian • Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, historian • Russel Stolfi, professor • Wolfgang Strauss, historian • Ilmari Susiluoto, professor, PhD • Viktor Suvorov, former Soviet spy • Tapio Tiihonen, historian • Ernst Topitsch, historian.

From Josif Stalin's speech, May 5, 1941:

"But now that we have reformed our army, acquired weapons technology required for modern warfare, now that we have become strong - now we must move on from defense to attack.

As we were improving our nation's defense, we gave up attacking. We shall now move from defensive to offensive war politics. It is necessary for us to renew our educational work, propaganda, agitation and print in offensive spirit.

The Red Army is a modern army - but, it must be remembered, that a modern army is an army of attack."

Andrei Zhdanov, Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, stated to the Military Council of the Supreme Soviet in June, 1941:

"We have become strong, and we can now begin accomplishing things by more active approach. The wars in Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We already have started on the road of attacking politicks."

In his book 'Venäjän idea' ("the Idea of Russia"), pages 606-607, 2001, the President of Finland Mauno Koivisto (PhD) writes:

"In 1995, a new print of the memoirs of Marshal Georgi Zhukov was published. ... Zhukov gives a very unembellished picture of how strictly Stalin prohibited all defensive preparations."

Soviet general admits Finland's defensive victory



By August, 1944, it had become clear to all that Finland could not be over-taken militarily. The Finns had pushed the Red Army back behind the nations' border and had held it there until the war's end. Thus, from the military point of view, Finland had won the war.

On the Leningrad sector, the final showdown had to be fought on the Finnish side of the pre-WW2 Finnish-Soviet border, because the border here ran along the outskirts of Leningrad and Marshal Mannerheim had strictly ordered the Finns to stay out of the city.

On June 17, 1944, before the anticipated summer offensive of the Red Army, Finnish General Oesch - with Mannerheim's approval - made a final decision about a defensive line, where the Finnish ground forces would be withdrawn on this sector and where the Red Army would be stopped. According to the plan and using delaying tactics, on this sector the Finnish army was drawn back to the so called VKT -defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus.

Prior to the approaching fierce defensive fight on the VKT-line, Finland's second largest city Viipuri had to be rescued from bombardment, however. The Finns had fought hard about Viipuri in the Winter War, and they had won the battle, only to end up ceding the city to the Soviets shortly after in a peace agreement, in attempt to end all hostilities.

On June 20, 1944, the Finns executed a strategic abandonment of Viipuri in only a few hours' time. The day’s fighting in Viipuri was brought to a halt by 16:40, leaving only 120 Finns dead or missing in action (Eeva Tammi, 2006).

Following the abandonment of Viipuri, the narrow but massive Soviet spearhead on the Karelian Isthmus was faced in a nearby rural area on the VKT-line, in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Although the Soviet offensive turned out to be extremely fierce, the VKT-line proved impenetrable, despite an unprecedented Soviet fire power which included an artillery bombardment in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala unlike never seen before.

After suffering a loss in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala, not before, the Soviets began withdrawing Red Army divisions - what was left of them - from the Finnish front, to be joined with the Allied forces now advancing towards Berlin.

All the war’s nine final and determining major battles in the summer and fall of 1944 were victorious for the Finns. Furthermore, ever since the start of the Continuation War in 1941, the Soviets had not been able to cross the preceding (1940) Finnish-Soviet border during the entire war, lasting over three years, except for a short-lived moment in the final major battle in Ilomantsi in 1944.

In the Battle of Ilomantsi too - fought from July 26 to August 13, 1944 -, the Red Army suffered a devastating loss, when two of its divisions were fully decimated and shattered as the Soviets were pushed back.

On all battle fronts, the Finns were deep on the Soviet soil at the war's end. Of the pre-WW2 territory eventually ceded to the Soviet Union in 1947, the Red Army had won only a fraction in battles.

After the Continuation War, the Finns had a war against the Nazis, who had to be chased out of Finland next.

By the end, Finland had done all that was necessary to protect its citizens and land against the overwhelming odds, fighting against both the Soviets and the Nazis, while remaining friendship with the Americans who sponsored the Soviet war efforts but kept open their embassy in Helsinki throughout the entire WW2.

Until the end of the Continuation War, Finland had kept its stance that it will never sign an unconditional peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, just as Finland's war had been separate and different from the war between the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers, Finland's treaty of peace too was separate and different from the one forced to the Axis Powers.

Whereas the Finnish-Soviet Continuation War ended in 1944, and its aftermath was dealt under a conditional peace treaty, the war between the Allied Powers and Axis Powers ended in 1945, and the aftermath of that was dealt under an unconditional treaty, which meant a total surrender for the Axis Powers.

Unlike Nazi leaders an their allies, many of whom were sentenced to death, the Marshal of Finland Mannerheim was named the President of Finland on August 4, 1944, while the Continuation War was still being waged. He remained in office until March 4, 1946, when he resigned and retired - 19 months after the Continuation War had ended.

Finland had won the Continuation War - in only way a defensive war can be won - by a defensive victory.

In the book 'Bitva za Leningrad, 1941-1944' (Битва за Ленинград), edited by the Soviet Lieutenant General S.P. Platonov and published in the Soviet Union by Voenizdat Ministerstva oborony SSSR in 1964, the general discusses the massive Soviet summer offensive against the Finns in 1944 and the final battles on the critical Leningrad sector.

The Soviet general confirms that the Soviet intention was to penetrate "deep into Finland". He admits the Finnish defensive victory and the failure of the Soviets "to carry out the tasks assigned to them". Page 178:

"The repeated offensive attempts of the Soviet forces from the bridgehead failed to gain results. The enemy was able to significantly tighten the formation of its forces in the area and to fend off all attacks of our troops."

"During the offensive operations, lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July, the forces of the right flank of the Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks assigned to them on the orders of the Supreme Command, issued on June 21.

Our forces did not succeed to advance to the Finnish-Soviet border and to clear the Karelian Isthmus of enemy forces. By moving enough reinforcements to the area, the Finnish war command stopped the attack of the Soviet forces from the Karelian Isthmus deep into Finland."